On December 16, the House Transportation Committee held a hearing with an unremarkable title: "Changes in Maritime Technology: Can the Coast Guard Keep Up?" What emerged was more interesting than the name suggested. The Coast Guard is pouring hundreds of millions into autonomous systems through its Force Design 2028 plan while simultaneously enforcing regulations that prevent anyone else from deploying the same technology commercially.

That's not bureaucratic inefficiency. It's a genuine paradox built into law.

The Coast Guard lacks statutory authority to waive minimum crew requirements for commercial vessels. Period. The Government Accountability Office confirmed this in August: statutes mandate crew minimums by vessel tonnage, and the Coast Guard cannot grant exceptions outside a pilot program for SpaceX rocket recovery. Yet, the service has established a dedicated Program Executive Office for Robotics and Autonomous Systems, committed over $350M to unmanned platforms, and started awarding contracts.

Defense gets the capability. Commercial operators get the wait.

Force Design 2028 went operational in August when the Coast Guard achieved initial operating capability for its RAS PEO. Anthony Antognoli, the service's first program executive officer for robotics and autonomous systems, oversees what the Coast Guard describes as "the most transformational enhancement to capability since the inception of aviation."

The initial spending tells you what that transformation looks like. VideoRay is delivering 16 Defender remotely operated vehicles to replace the Deployable Specialized Forces' aging ROV fleet. Qinetiq is supplying ruggedized ground robots for Coast Guard Strike Teams responding to hazmat incidents. Skydio just contracted 125 short-range drones for infrastructure inspection and post-disaster assessment. None of this is experimental. These are production contracts for operational deployment.

The Coast Guard already operates autonomous systems at sea. ScanEagle drones have been flying drug interdiction missions from National Security Cutters since 2016 under a contractor-operated model with Insitu. Five Saildrone wind-powered autonomous surface vessels patrol the US-Mexico maritime border, providing surveillance coverage. The service recently added V-BAT vertical-takeoff drones that contributed to what the Coast Guard calls historic drug seizures (hundreds of thousands of pounds interdicted in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean).

Every one of these platforms demonstrates technical feasibility, operational effectiveness, and cost advantages over traditional crewed assets. The technology works. The Coast Guard knows it works because it uses it.

Commercial shipping companies cannot.

Since 2024, the Coast Guard has processed dozens of requests from commercial operators wanting to deploy autonomous vessels in US waters. Each request gets evaluated individually by the local Captain of the Port. There's no standardized framework, no consistent risk-assessment methodology, and no published guidance on what qualifies for approval.

Industry stakeholders told the GAO that this inconsistency makes capital investment decisions nearly impossible. You don't fund a $50M autonomous vessel development program when regulatory approval depends on which port you operate from and which Captain happens to be reviewing your application. The Coast Guard is working on standardized guidance, but "working on" doesn't write checks.

The SpaceX rocket recovery program stands as the only statutory exception to crew requirements, authorized through the 2022 Coast Guard Authorization Act. It covers unmanned operations for space launch and recovery activities. Nothing else. The exception proves two things: Congress can act when commercial need is clear, and Congress hasn't acted for anyone else.

Why the constraint? Federal statutes prescribe minimum crew sizes based on vessel gross tonnage and require credentialed masters for commercial operations. These laws assume humans aboard. The Coast Guard, as GAO confirmed, has no authority to waive these requirements outside the narrow SpaceX carveout. Any commercial operator wanting to reduce or eliminate crew faces statutory barriers that the Coast Guard cannot remove through regulation or policy guidance.

The service proves autonomous operations work while enforcing rules that prevent commercial scaling. That's the paradox.

The international regulatory framework isn't helping. The International Maritime Organization is developing a goal-based code for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships, but the timeline requires patience. The non-mandatory MASS Code gets finalized in May 2026. An experience-building phase runs through 2028. Development of the mandatory code starts in 2028. Adoption is not expected before July 2030. Entry into force: January 1, 2032.

Seven years from now.

During that window, flag states with permissive regulations can authorize autonomous operations under existing frameworks. Norway already has. Singapore is moving. The UAE is experimenting. These jurisdictions will accumulate operational data, develop technical standards, establish safety records, and influence what the mandatory IMO Code ultimately requires. First-mover advantages go to whoever moves first.

The US isn't moving. American-flagged vessels remain bound by domestic crew statutes regardless of what the IMO permits internationally. Foreign competitors operating under different flag-state regimes face no such constraint. The Coast Guard can invest in autonomous technology for military and law enforcement missions, but the commercial maritime sector, which could leverage those same advances, stays locked out.

Consider the implications. The Coast Guard is funding the development of autonomous maritime capabilities through defense procurement. VideoRay, Qinetiq, Skydio, and others are building systems with taxpayer dollars. The resulting technology gets deployed on Coast Guard missions. Then foreign-flagged vessels potentially license those same US-developed capabilities and deploy them commercially while American operators wait for statutory reform.

That's not hypothetical. It's the current trajectory unless something changes.

The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2025, signed into law as part of the December defense bill, creates new advisory structures and pilot programs. There's a National Advisory Committee on Autonomous Maritime Systems bringing together government, industry, and academia. Pilot programs will test governance frameworks for small uncrewed vessels. Multiple studies are mandated covering everything from medium-range drone capabilities to data exploitation from autonomous sensors.

None of it changes the underlying statutory constraints.

These provisions are scaffolding, not solutions. They establish mechanisms for gathering information, building consensus, and demonstrating concepts. The actual regulatory pathway requires Congressional action to modify crew requirement statutes or grant the Coast Guard express waiver authority. The Act doesn't do that. It sets the stage for eventually doing that, maybe, if the studies and pilots and committees produce compelling evidence.

Meanwhile, Force Design 2028 is deploying systems now. Contracts are awarded. Platforms are operational. The Coast Guard's Research and Development Center in New London is testing optionally crewed vessels in partnership with Sea Machines Robotics, converting existing Coast Guard platforms to seamlessly transition between crewed, remote, and autonomous modes. The technology development and regulatory reform timelines are completely misaligned.

You can see where this is heading. Defense and law enforcement autonomous systems will become increasingly sophisticated and operationally proven over the next seven years. Commercial operators watch from the sidelines, constrained by regulations written when "unmanned vessel" meant a boat that broke its mooring line. International competitors move ahead under permissive flag-state frameworks. By the time the mandatory IMO Code takes effect in 2032, the US commercial maritime sector will be seven years behind on operational experience, technical standards development, and market positioning.

Unless Congress decides the SpaceX exception shouldn't be the only exception.

Next Week: The kelp economy (finally) gets its turn. We'll look at who's actually farming ocean biomaterials at a commercial scale, what the production economics look like, and why defense contractors are suddenly interested in seaweed.

Since you have been, thanks for reading.

Cheers,

Mick